Reputation is crucial to insurers' ability to sell insurance policies because customers cannot observe policy quality prior to purchase. Once a good reputation is established, customers will pay more than the marginal cost of an insurance policy in expectation of quality, and thereby reputation itself can be a valuable asset for insurers. Due to the unobserved policy quality, insurers have two potential strategies for earning future rents: maintaining the policy quality that originally established their reputation or offering the lowest quality policies until customers update their beliefs. The latter is a form of moral hazard and can result in loss of reputation.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to identify key factors associated with insurer reputational risk. To do so, we first review the economic theory of reputation formation and identify parameters that comprise reputation equilibrium. Assuming a price not perfectly elastic to the change in parameter values, we regard the change in the parameter values as potential causes of a loss of reputation.
We then test those factors to observe if the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical prediction.
For the empirical study, we employ data consisting of insurers' internally-and externally-caused operational risk loss events. Internally-caused events include such activities as fraud, which have been shown to be associated with a loss of reputation value in the prior literature. Externally-caused operational risk events are those outside of the insurer's control, such as loss due to natural disasters, and those categorized in non-operational risk loss events such as strategic risk. Combined with the findings in the prior studies, by investigating the association between theoretically-identified factors and the occurrence of the internally-and externally-caused operational risk loss events experienced by U.S.-domiciled insurers, we conclude that those factors are not only actually associated with insurer's moral hazard but also could cause their reputational loss.
Organizations have long understood that sustained financial success is dependent on the strength of their reputation, leading to research on corporate reputation in many disciplines such as economics, marketing, and management (e.g. Fombrun and van Riel, 1997) . As Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) demonstrate, firms need to build a strong positive reputation to succeed in an environment where information asymmetries and repeated contracts exist.
Building reputation is particularly important to insurance companies because consumers cannot observe how the product (an insurance policy) actually performs before purchasing the policy. They know only after experiencing a claim. That is, insurance transactions take place under asymmetric information held by the insurer. Furthermore, even for insurers who wish to share their private information, doing so is difficult.
In such an environment of asymmetric information and repeated contracts, once good reputation is acquired, however, they can sell policies at a price more than its value and consumers pay more for insurance coverage than the value of what they receive (e.g. Horner, 2002 , for the theoretical argument in competitive market). As a result, insurer's private information allows an insurer to earn information rents as long as consumers have a belief that the insurer will fulfill their expectation regarding explicit and implicit promises on a policy. Thus, an insurer's reputation plays a significant role in the insurance transaction.
We note that consumers are just one segment of an insurer's stakeholders. Investors, employees, regulators, and the public at large all have an interest in insurer solvency and product/service quality, as well as firm behavior in relation to its employees, vendors, and the community. Each of these stakeholders may have both explicit and implicit contracts with the insurer. Their expectations as to how the insurer will fulfill these various contractual promises affect an insurer's reputation. In this paper, however, we focus on an insurer's performance on contractual promises with customers.
"Reputation is ultimately about how your business is perceived by stakeholders including cus-tomers, investors, regulators, the media and the wider public" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005) .
As implied by this statement, corporate reputation could be affected by a wide variety of factors.
Reputation depends not only on how an organization acts but also on how the action is perceived by various stakeholders with different interests and with different preferences. In addition, stakeholder interests change over time. Furthermore, reputation has been studied from a variety of perspectives and within a variety of disciplines. While we are informed by those variations and will reference them as appropriate, our focus will be on the economic theory of moral hazard. Without moral hazard, reputation is an irrelevant concern; therefore we use it as the basis of our theoretical illustration and empirical analyses.
Our empirical approach can be distinguished from existing reputational loss event studies in two aspects. First, our focus is on what we consider to be the genesis of reputational risk, moral hazard, and the factors that increase the likelihood of moral hazard. Most prior studies focused on the amount of losses of reputation value from reputational risk events. Second, we use the date when an insurer starts committing moral hazard as the start date of analysis, whereas other reputational loss studies evaluate the impact of revealed information on stock price around the date of information disclosure.
The primary advantage of our approach is to reveal the factors that provoke insurer's moral hazard which could eventually cause loss of its reputation value. The intention is to offer applicable information to regulatory and consumer efforts to contain such behavior. For instance, our analysis shows that interest rate is one of the most significant exogenous factors that could induce insurers to commit moral hazard, while the insurance industry average stock return and the market index (SP500) return are both not significant. This result indicates that insurers are more likely to start taking reputational risks when overall economy performs well. Understanding such significant factors provides useful information to manage insurer reputation and a guidance of efficient monitoring of insurer actions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the background of reputational risk by surveying existing reputational loss studies and risk-taking studies, and then briefly discuss our approach, which deviates from prior work in several important aspects. In Section 3, an incentive constraint for reputation formation is reviewed to derive key elements of reputational loss. The implications of the theoretical model are summarized in Section 4. We then present our data, measures, and empirical models in Section 5, followed by the test results in Section 6. The last section draws conclusions and discusses certain limitations of our arguments.
Background: Studies on Reputation and Moral Hazard 2.1 Reputation Studies
Even before reputational risk was recognized as one of the most important elements of risk management, researchers investigated the association between specific types of corporate misconduct and loss of reputation to show the existence and level of market-based penalties. 1 Karpoff and Lott (1993) study alleged corporate frauds and identify significant losses in equity value when customers or other related parties are the damaged party, and Alexander (1999) extends their concept of reputational penalty by using federal crime data. Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk (1999) and Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) focus on the reputational penalty incurred due to military procurement fraud and an environmental violation, respectively. Furthermore, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) investigate the market impact of financial misrepresentation and identify unexplained excess loss. Murphy, Shrieves, and Tibbs (2007) test the effect of types of corporate misconduct on changes in a firm's profitability and risk.
In the financial services sector, Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006) are the first to consider reputational effects of operational events. They conclude that the stock price reaction to operational loss events exceeds the underlying loss value, indicating reputational effects. They also find larger effects for insurers than for banks. Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) and Gillet, Hubner, and Plunus (2007) also investigate financial services firms and conclude that internal frauds significantly affect the firm's reputation, whereas externally caused losses show no significant effect.
We utilize those empirical findings that internally-caused loss events have an adverse impact on firm reputation value, that is, causing reputational loss. By examining factors that might cause those events, we can conclude that the factors not only cause loss events but also reputational losses.
1 Reputational loss is measured as the loss of a firm's market value minus the tangible loss of an operational risk event, typically in an event study approach. A potential problem of this measurement is that: (1) risk is not appropriately adjusted because public disclosure of a reputational loss event changes a firm's risk and the required return, and (2) it implicitly assumes that shareholders do not expect the operational loss event at all before public revelation of the event (e.g. Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985) .
Each of these reputation studies helps us understand the reputational effects of some types of operational loss events. However, their focus is on whether specific event types cause reputational loss; they do not investigate why reputational loss occurs. This study takes a different course than that pursued by the studies just discussed in that our focus is on factors that might cause insurers to deviate from customer expectations, whereas the extant work examines factors associated with loss of reputation value. To put it a different way, our investigation takes place at the point in time when the operational risk loss events start to occur, while prior work tends to analyze the loss after the event is publicly revealed. In short, we focus on reputational risk rather than reputational loss. This paper investigates general underlying determinants of conflicts of interest and thus its findings should have broad relevance. Such determinants are identifiable in the early theoretical studies on reputation formation. Since the seminal work of Klein and Leffler (1981) , a series of studies have been conducted in producer-customer settings where customers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase and so their expectations about the quality are based on previous observations (e.g. Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984) . 2 Klein and Leffler (1981) illustrate that discounted future rents discourage producers from deceiving customers by selling low-quality products at a high-quality price if the discounted future rent is larger than the one-time profit from deceiving customers. Their study informally describes a systematic association between firm integrity and future rents. Despite some variation in their model settings, a common finding from studies is that a high-quality product fulfilling customer expectations can be sold at a price higher than its marginal cost once firms acquire their good reputations, and this rent encourages firms to maintain their reputations.
One of the major concerns expressed in the early reputation studies (e.g. Holmström, 1999) was the possibility that once a good reputation has been established, the firm or its manager will tend to rest on its laurels, so to speak, and fail to expend the effort necessary to maintain the reputation. However, recent studies such as Hörner (2002) and Tadelis (2002) present a solution to this problems. Hörner (2002) identifies equilibrium conditions under which firms will always work to maintain their place in a competitive market. In his model, consumers' merciless behavior in abandoning firms that record a bad outcome strongly motivates firms to always do their best. And Tadelis (2002) shows that incentives to preserve reputation can be ageless if it can be separated from entity (firm) and can be tradable in the market.
Bank and Insurance Risk-Taking Studies
Thus, in economic theory, whether reputation is preserved is nothing but moral hazard problem in multiple periods where the choice of actions cannot be observed by another party. As readers might notice, the argument that sufficient future rents encourage firms to preserve their reputations is exactly what franchise value theory implies (Marcus, 1984) : When market competition is not intense in that market entry is restricted, firm's charter value discourages them to take excessive risks due to the bankruptcy cost. On the other hand, market competition reduces the charter value, which reduces self-regulating incentives as well.
Researchers have discussed the effect of market competition on the risk-taking and have empirically identified the inverse association between franchise value and risk-taking (e.g. Keeley, 1990; Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan, 1996; Fang, 2005 , in banking literature). In insurance, understanding that excessive risk-taking in liability is a major cause of insurer insolvency, Harrington and Danzon (1994) investigate the inverse association between intangible assets and risk-taking in terms of insurer's underpricing. Regarding insurers' asset risk, Yu, Lin, Oppenheimer, and Chen (2008) find evidence to support the inverse relation.
However, the findings regarding the association between franchise value and risk-taking incentives are mix. For instance, Saunders and Wilson (2001) shows that banks' risk-constraining incentives of franchise value depend on overall market condition: market expansion/contraction periods. And, in insurance, Ren and Schmit (2008) theoretically and empirically show that the relation between franchise value and insurers' risk-taking depends on the degree of market competition within the industry. They argue that insurers with a large franchise value could take greater risk than those with small franchise value do.
The effect of franchise value (bankruptcy cost in a broader perspective) is discussed under shareholder's agency problems, often referred to as asset substitution theory: the shareholder's incentive to increase asset risk at the debtholder's expense (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Green and Talmor, 1986) . 3 In banking literature, the risk-insensitive rated deposit insurance also enhances the shareholder's risk-taking incentive because deposit option value increases with asset risk (Merton, 1977) .
With such underlying agency problems, banking and insurance literature have investigated the effect of capital requirement on risk-taking. For instance, theoretical studies show that asset risktaking incentives decline for well-capitalized banks because the option value increases with the leverage ratio (e.g. Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990) . In contrast, empirical findings indicate the positive relation between capital and risk, which indicates risk-based capital (e.g. Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Cummins and Sommer, 1996) . 4
Incentive condition for Reputation Formation
According to existing risk-taking literature, it may be reasonable to focus on factors such as all-inone measure of franchise value as a proxy for a stream of future rents and capital structure, in order to test insurer's reputation preserving incentives. Instead, in this section, we describe the condition under which insurers will have incentives to behave in accordance with positive reputation to derive factors consisting of future rent. The primary reason that we deliberately return to a simple setting and decompose insurer's future rent into its components is to explicitly describe the role of those exogenous factors including the efficiency of information sharing, which plays a significant role in insurer's rents and risk-taking incentives.
As a setup of the theoretical illustration, we consider repeated insurance transactions in which insurers sell policies and consumers obtain policies in exchange for premiums. An important assumption here is that consumers cannot observe how an insurer performs contracts prior to purchase. This assumption is fairly realistic because consumers do tend to make insurance purchase decisions without knowing much about insurer claim paying practices and ability. The chronological order of consumer premium payment and insurer contingent claim payment is part of the nature of the insurance system, we cannot avoid information asymmetry between insurer and consumer regarding how an insurer performs, which is referred to as policy quality.
To be precise regarding what we mean by policy quality, we refer in this paper to a value representing all non-quantity aspects of a policy. In other words, policy quality captures the overall as another topic (e.g. Cummins and Sommer, 1996) .
4 See Staking and Babbel (1995) , for the comprehensive view of these factors in the property-liability insurers value of an insurer's performance on contractual promises with consumers. By doing so, high quality of a policy in this paper implies good customer services, appropriate and prompt claim payments, a sufficient amount of capital, adequate reserves, and safe investments.
Because consumers cannot judge the policy quality in advance of having a claim, their expectations as to performance are based, to various degrees, on previous observations. The key feature of reputation formation models is that the time lag of updating customer expectations allows an insurer with a good reputation to earn profit in one of two ways: (1) it can earn relatively small, but constant, amounts of rent by selling policies of the expected quality at a fair premium (reputation strategy), or (2) it can earn a relatively larger (per period), but short-term, profit by selling as many low-quality policies as possible at a price customers expect to pay for a high-quality policy before customers become aware that the policies are low quality (moral hazard ). For insurers to choose a reputation strategy, the profits earned from this strategy must be at least as large as those that could be made from committing moral hazard. This is known as an incentive constraint; that is, if profits earned from the reputation strategy are big enough, insurers will not damage their reputation by engaging in moral hazard behavior.
To specify parameters that play a role of determining an insurer's incentive to preserves good reputation, we now introduce an insurer's incentive constraint that must be satisfied under a simple setting, assuming that the reputation equilibrium price is given. Let p(q) and c(q) be a unit equilibrium price and a unit cost corresponding to the policy quality q, where q ∈ [q 0 , ∞) and q 0 > 0.
To define policy quality, we refer in this paper to a value representing all non-quantity aspects of a policy. In other words, policy quality captures the overall value of an insurer's performance on contractual promises with consumers except for the value corresponding to a predetermined coverage amount. As mentioned earlier, high quality of a policy in this paper could consist of, although not a complete list of factors, good customer services, appropriate and prompt claim payments, a sufficient amount of capital, adequate reserves, and safe investments. Thus, the bigger the value of q, the better the quality of the policy.
q 0 is defined as the minimum policy quality required by law, and the performance q < q 0 is verifiable. That is, all operating insurers offer policies with quality at least as great as q 0 . For instance, the minimum policy quality can be interpreted as a policy sold by an insurer satisfying just minimum capital requirement. 5
In addition, the cost function is assumed to be increasing, c (q) ≥ 0, and also marginally increasing, c (q) > 0, with respect to the quality. Further, the time interval between policy renewal is represented by T ; the interest rate is i. Thus, the time factor between policy purchases is denoted as r = e iT − 1.
Perfect Revelation Model
To illustrate the base case of customer updating of belief as to policy quality, consider that R t = q t−1 . This simple belief updating means that the quality sold in the current period is known by all potential customers before they make a purchasing decision in the next period, where R represents a firm's reputation. Or, to put it in more concrete terms, in the base case, policyholders with claim experiences during a current policy period quickly and uniformly distribute information gleaned from this experience to all potential customers for the next policy period, thus making the future customers better informed as to the policy quality.
However, it may be more realistic to assume a longer time lag in information distribution. To generalize the previous belief updating assumption, let L > 0 be the necessary time for quality information to be fully distributed to and have an effect on customers. That is, we consider
Then, the incentive constraint can be formulated as:
The left-hand side of Equation (1) is the L-time profit realized from engaging in the moral hazard, that is, selling as many lowest-quality policies for the price of expected-quality as possible before customers become aware of the true quality. The right-hand side of the equation shows the discounted sum of profits generated by the reputation strategy, that is, selling policies of the expected quality at the fair price. These quantities are illustrated in Figure 1 . The short-term large profit (the infinite stream of relatively small profit) in Figure 1 corresponds to the left-hand side (the right-hand side) of Equation (1). The inequality requires that the profit produced by the moral hazard must not be greater than that garnered from the reputation strategy, thus encouraging maintenance of a good reputation.
[ Insert Figure 1 Here ]
Partial Revelation Model
To this point, it has been assumed that information about policy quality is completely disclosed and equally shared among all customers with some time lag. However, it may be more reasonable in insurance transactions that information on how insurers perform contractual promises may be shared by only a fraction of customers (See Shapiro, 1983) . Let θ be the fraction of customers who obtain previous performance information. With one time lag of information sharing, the belief updating can be formalized as:
This formulation implies that information as to the quality of policies sold in the previous period is revealed to only a fraction of customers, and that the information will never be perfectly distributed even though an insurer continues to sell policies with the same quality. This is a fairly realistic situation in the insurance industry because only a small fraction of policyholders have any experience with claim services. Hence they may observe if an insurer promptly pay claims without underpayment. Most policyholders however receive, at most, an occasional letter informing them of changes to their policy and when the renewal premium is due. Thus, even in the "real" world, customers' beliefs are only partially updated by the insurer's current performance. The incentive condition can be formulated as:
It is obvious that the condition can be reduced to Equations (1) with L=1 if perfect revelation, θ=1, is assumed.
We have thus established the incentive conditions necessary for reputation to be sustained (reputation equilibrium) and have noted certain parameters that play a significant role in this condition. We now turn to a discussion of the factors that might cause loss of reputation.
Reputational Risk
In the previous section, we show that moral hazard could occur when price does not satisfy the incentive condition. That is, unless price is quickly adjusted to the change in parameters consisting of the price, the change in the parameters can be a cause of moral hazard, which could eventually induce a loss of reputation.
Thus, to discuss the effect of the change in parameters on insurer's incentives, we assume that insurers have acquired their good reputation in the market and that equilibrium price is given and is not fully sensitive to the change in the parameters. 6 Among parameters are future rents, discount rate, time interval between contract renewal, time lag of information dispersal, proportion of performance revelation, and minimum policy quality-all of which will come under investigation in this section.
We also investigate what effects irrational behavior by stakeholders has on the insurer moral hazard problem. Since an insurer's optimal course of action depends on how such action will be perceived by stakeholders, stakeholder irrationality could have a substantial impact on the insurer's decision making, and thus seems worth investigating.
A. Profitability from Maintaining Reputation (p(q)-c(q))
A first factor is the profit to be gained per policy from maintaining reputation (p(q)-c(q)). The effect of this quantity is obvious. Recall that this quantity appears on the right-hand side of the incentive constraints. Therefore, if this profitability is large ex ante, insurers will continue to offer high-quality policies. However, if the expected profit becomes small, moral hazard may be induced.
Note that future profitability could be affected by various factors as well. Although we further discuss proxies related this factor in our empirical analysis, market competition, time since firm establishment, and business growth perspective have all significant impacts on future rents.
First, market competition should be one of most significant factors that could affect the amount of the information rent. If it is expected that the insurance market would become more compet-6 Since insurance policies are not traded on the public market, the condition tends to be met.
itive than before, the equilibrium price would be reduced and preserving reputation becomes less attractive for insurers. The time since insurer establishment is also important to determine the incentive. It is possible that highly reputed insurers with a long history could lose an incentive to keep up offering high-quality policies because customers fully believe that those insurers perform contracts as they expect and attribute some observations of low-quality policies to just accidents.
Business growth perspective is another components consisting of total amount of future rents. If insurers have negative perspective to the growth of their future business, maintaining reputation becomes less attractive. On the other hand, if they can expect a growth of their business, they become more tolerant to current relatively small profits.
B. Discount Rate (i )
Consider the impact of the change in discount rate on the incentive constraint. Although discount rate appears on the both sides of the incentive constraints, the effect is stronger on the right-hand side of Equation (1) when the time lag in belief updating, L, is short because the right-hand side involves an infinite period of time. Similarly, the impact is larger on the right-hand side of Equation (3) if the proportion of information revelation, θ, is large.
For a given price, if the discount rate increases (large i ), the value of future rent generated by selling high-quality policies decreases and so does the insurer's incentive to offer high-quality policies. This can be also interpreted as meaning that when an insurer's subjective discount rate increases, equivalently when insurer's tolerance decreases, due to its increased cost of capital or higher rate of market return, the insurer loses its incentive to maintain its good reputation because maximizing immediate profits by taking moral hazard could be relatively attractive under a large discount rate. In empirical analysis, discount rate represents several factors such as interest rate, idiosyncratic stock rate of return, the industry average rate of return, stock market return. We are interested in which rates are significantly associated with insurer's incentives to moral hazard.
C. Time Interval between Successive Contracts (T )
This is the factor representing a time interval between policy renewals in which customers reflect their beliefs to their decisions. Since this parameter tend to be insurance product specific and should be unchanged over time, the effect of the dynamic change of this parameter on an insurer's incentive to moral hazard may not be expected. However, this still significantly affect insurer's reputation value because different types of insurance tend to involve contracts of different lengths.
For instance, life insurance is more likely to be a long term contract than is a contract for nonlife insurance. That is, we consider that life insurers tend to have larger T relative to non-life insurers. Since this parameter determines the base time interval of quality information flow and of customers' belief updating, a large value represents inefficient information sharing. Thus, it is predicted that life insurers tend to have greater reputation value than non-life insurers due to the inefficient performance information sharing.
D. Information Sharing Time Lag (L)
This is the component that reflects the time necessary for customers to update their expectations.
For instance, if a customer purchased a policy and experienced a claim fairly soon thereafter, her expectation for the next period policy may be fully updated by the claim experience. However, if her only claim experience occurred 10 years ago, her beliefs may still be based on that distant experience due to a lack of recent observations. In either situation, customer inability to detect real-time changes in performance allows insurers to earn profits by taking moral hazard behaviors.
The amount of profit that can be earned from a moral hazard depends on how fast customers adapt their behavior to reflect information received about actual performance on contracts. Thus, if this updating process usually takes place quite slowly (large L), insurers may be tempted to engage in moral hazard, which will eventually result in reputation loss but at a point too far in the future for such to outweigh the benefits of the current profit-taking opportunity.
Our interest is if information travels at different speeds over time. As an intuitive example, firms' adverse news are reported more frequently when the market condition is bad than in a good market condition. Thus, it may be reasonable to consider that the parameter L could change over time.
E. Proportion of Revelation (θ)
The parameter θ represents a proportion of customers who obtain policy quality information and update their beliefs accordingly. That is, other customers must completely rely on previous reputation without the benefit of updating. This parameter has strong implication for the insurance market because, in contrast to other products, a large portion of policyholders never make a claim and so do not have the opportunity to observe how an insurer performs contracts firsthand. Put differently, it is difficult for customers to detect policy quality from own experience.
Thus, it may be reasonable to assume a small value of the parameter θ, which necessarily induces a large equilibrium premium and a large reputation value as well. However, different business lines will take varying values of this parameter. For instance, an extreme case would be life insurance where by its very nature the insured never experiences payoff of the claim himself or herself. Health insurance may fall at the opposite end of the spectrum in that policyholders do tend to visit medical doctors and thus can directly observe the quality of the policy. In this case, the parameter θ may be relatively high. Other business lines such as auto insurance and homeowners insurance may lie between these two cases.
Again, our concern is whether this parameter would change over time, because if this is time constant, we do observe the cross-sectional difference of reputation value but is not supposed to observe any impact on insurer's incentives. One practical illustration of the change in this parameter would be insurer' voluntary information disclosure activities such as press release, conference calls, and management forecasts. If these recent managerial efforts actually improve the efficiency of information sharing with stakeholders, insurers should have less incentive to slack off than before.
F. Minimum quality of Policy (q 0 )
Minimum policy quality q 0 appears only on the left-hand side of the incentive constraints. Thus, a higher minimum quality decreases the benefits of moral hazard because it sets a quality threshold below which no policy can be sold by operating insurers. The effects of this factor may be relevant to various regulatory standards, such as insolvency risk. How could this parameter cause a moral hazard problem? One possible scenario involves lack of appropriate monitoring, which may explain the recent case of AIG's operation of AIG Financial Products. It is now known that regulators for the non-insurance foreign operation failed at an early stage to reveal the excessive risk the company took by selling CDS. If AIG had expected that its excessive risk taking would have been quickly caught through appropriate monitoring, the disaster might have been averted.
From the perspective of minimum quality requirements, the future rent generated by the excessive risk taking (p(q) − c(q 0 )) is increased due to lowered q 0 . Therefore, a moral hazard might have been the optimal strategy for AIG.
G. Irrational behavior
We also consider that stakeholder irrational beliefs could cause distorted decision making on the part of the insurer, leading to moral hazard. Since managers take into account how stakeholders will react when making business decisions, their decisions could be distorted by irrational, or even simply inaccurate, stakeholder beliefs as to the value of the insurer's fundamentals.
How could managerial decisions be affected by overvalued stock prices? One way is that when an insurer's stock price is overvalued, customers may be willing to pay premiums that are greater than that corresponding to the insurer's fundamentals and if rational managers are aware of this phenomenon, they might choose moral hazard to take advantage of the current overvaluation to maximize the profit.
Looking at incentive constraints, premium p(q) appears on both sides of the equations. When managers consider that current premium is inflated due to overvalued fundamentals but that this situation will not last, the left-hand side of incentive constraints tend to becomes larger, which is conducive to moral hazard. Inadequate monitoring of rating agencies could cause a similar effect if an insurer receives an inappropriately good financial rating.
Thus, irrational beliefs, particularly in regard to overvaluation of an insurer's fundamentals, could lead to a conflict of interest and, eventually, loss of customer confidence in the insurer's operation.
We have discussed various factors that could affect insurer's incentives. In identifying these factors, we focused on insurer optimal decisions that induce conflicts of interest between the insurer and its customers, eventually leading to loss of customer's confidence in the insurer's operation.
The factors we discussed above are consistent with existing reputation theory; however, the list should not be taken as all-inclusive as there may very well be other factors that have the potential to damage an insurer's reputation.
The following is a summary of our theoretical predictions.
• Future Profitability: The smaller the rent generated by the reputation strategy, the less motive there is to engage in such a reputation strategy.
• Discount Rate: Higher discount rates or higher required rates of return make an insurer less patient with the long-term view, and thus tends to encourage moral hazard.
• Time Interval between Successive Contracts: A longer time interval between contract renewals makes information sharing less efficient and induces a conflict of interest.
• Information Sharing Time Lag: A longer time lag for sharing performance information keeps adverse information unrevealed for a longer time and gives insurers an incentive to slack off.
• Proportion of Revelation: A smaller proportion of customers with updated beliefs as to product performance implies that most customers will be unable to access current information, which reduces the incentive to maintain reputation.
• Minimum Performance of Policy: Lower minimum performance requirements make moral hazard more attractive, possibly leading to loss of reputation.
• Irrational Beliefs: Overvaluation of the insurer's fundamentals may induce distorted decision making on its part and lead to a conflict of interest.
In the following sections, we test these theoretical predictions by using financial data and operational risk loss event data. To the extent that appropriate proxies are available, the test is designed to discover whether the above discussed factors actually do cause conflicts of interest as predicted.
5 Data, Measure and Model
Sample Selection and Data Source
To test our theory that firms will seek to protect its positive reputation as long as the anticipated profit from doing so exceeds the anticipated profit from demonstrating moral hazard, we gathered data on U.S. based publicly-traded insurance companies (classified in the SIC major group 63) over to allow three years for operational risk loss events to be publicly revealed. 7 This waiting period is necessary because operational risk loss events reported in the FIRST database 8 indicate that it takes about three years (1,096 days) in median for the events to be publicly revealed. Figure 2 shows the survival probability of the time elapsed for operational risk loss events to be publicly revealed since the occurrence of loss events. Thus, including the recent years may cause to underestimate the effects of factors on the occurrence of events. When we remove 2005 from our analysis to allow the three years, the test results are unaffected.
[ Insert Figure 2 Here ] After collecting data on the sample firms with the SIC code from both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and COMPUSTAT, we have 225 firms and 1495 firm-year observations for the period. Even though there are more insurance companies in the United States than appear in our sample, we restrict the samples for two reasons: (1) our analysis relies on stock prices, so only publicly-traded companies are appropriate, and (2) one stock price can represent multiple insurers affiliated through one parent company. From these two data sets, we collect information on each insurer as described below.
Response Variable -Frequency of Operational Risk Loss Events
For the response variable of our analysis, we are interested in the frequency of individual firm operational risk loss events. Specifically, we utilize the number of operational risk loss events defined as the sum of the number of events recorded in the FIRST database over each year.
The number of events is calculated according to event start occurrence date, which is defined as the date when the event started to occur rather than the date when the event is publicly disclosed. Note that these operational risk loss event measures are significantly correlated with insurer's size such as revenue and asset (Pearson correlation coefficients, 0.55 and 0.50, respectively). However, due to the strong correlation between these size measures, it is not reasonable to introduce both of them in estimation models. Therefore, we first control the size effect by dividing operational risk loss event measures by revenue. Thus, our response variables employed in empirical tests are the size-controlled number of operational risk loss events, EVENTS(Internal) and EVENT(External).
9 The BIS event-types included in EVENTS(Internal) are internal fraud; employment practices and workplace safety; clients, products & business practices; business disruption and system failures; execution, delivery & process management.
Further, we include asset measure in estimation models as a control variable.
[ Insert Figure 3 Here ]
Explanatory Variables
Our base hypothesis is that insurers will have incentive to act without moral hazard as long as the anticipated profit from such behavior exceeds the anticipated profit from acting with moral hazard. This is consistent with franchise value theory in that a large franchise value has a self-regulating effect. Furthermore, we anticipate that the balance between the two profitabilities will be affected by a number of factors. These factors consisting of the value of future rents are profitability from preserving reputation, discount factor, the speed with which information is spread to the consumer, and consumer irrational beliefs, although this list of factors are not exclusive. For each of these factors we have identified relevant measures to test our hypothesis.
Future Rents: First, anticipated future rents generally are taken to represent an organization's current value. The higher the value, the greater the influence of positive reputation to the firm.
One common method to measure future rents is through Tobin's Q ratio as an all-in-one measure of the expected discount value of a stream of future profits. The Q ratio is defined by:
where V E , V L , and V A represent the market value of equity, the book value of liabilities, and the book value of tangible assets, respectively. 10 The market value of equity is calculated by the closing stock price multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding plus the book value of preferred stock at the end of each quarter.
Using the book value of tangible assets as a proxy for the firm's replacement cost may raise some concern in other settings, but the book value of tangible assets in the insurance industry is a reasonable approximation of replacement cost because an insurer's assets are mainly held in the form of financial assets. Using the Q ratio makes it possible to capture all factors beyond replacement cost. If an insurer is expected to earn a stream of future profits, the ratio should be 10 Here, our definition of the Q ratio is equivalent to Book-to-Market ratio.
beyond unity and have a large value. If shareholders consider the insurer's reputation value to be insignificant, expected smaller future profits correspond to a lower Q ratio. In our analysis, the log-transformed Q ratio denoted by TOBINSQ is used. See Table 1 for variable descriptions.
[ Insert Table 1 Here ]
Note that the Q ratio represents overall future rent, that is, discounted expected future profits.
Therefore, all components discussed in the previous section should be reflected into this measure.
We consider other independent variables that reflect and affect the value of future rests. One such variable is the earning per share (EPS), which we include to capture the impact of current rent on risk-taking. We expect that a larger current rent (as evidenced by EPS) reduces managers' incentives to engage in the opportunistic strategy. We therefore anticipate a negative relationship between EPS and moral hazard.
Further, it is worth noting that the static size of future rents is irrelevant to risk-taking in our simple incentive illustration. Only a dynamic change in future rents, which upset equilibrium, could affects risk-taking decision. To examine the prediction of the effect of the dynamic change in future rents, we examine PC TOBINSQ and a percent change in earning per share (PC EPS). For the same reason, we also examine percent change measures (PC variable) of the variables discussed below.
Discount Rate: We use four variables to represent the discount factor: the insurance industry average stock holding return (INS RTRN), the S&P500 index return (SP500), the monthly Treasury bill rate (INTEREST), and a market sensitivity measure (BETA). Both INS RTRN and SP500 are excess returns (minus INTEREST). The first three rates of return are expected to be positively associated with the frequency of loss events because high discount rates make a stream of future rents less attractive and make insurers less patient. For instance, if the insurer's cost of capital is large, in other words, a high rate of return for stock is necessary, managers are required to invest accordingly, which type of investment tends to be associated with higher risk. In exchange for the benefit to shareholders, the credit risk of the insurer's debtholders, such as banks and policyholders, is increased. The excess S&P500 index return is supposed to capture capital market conditions (e.g. Saunders and Wilson, 2001 , for the effect of overall market condition on bank risk-taking).
And the interest rate reflects overall economy condition.
A sensitivity of stock return to market return (BETA) is also incorporated into our analysis.
The beta explains the systematic risk of the insurer. Therefore, by introducing this variable, we capture the impact of the market risk on the stock return by beta.
Information Sharing Efficiency: Our incentive illustration contains three information-related parameters: time interval between successive contracts, information sharing time lag, and proportion of quality information revelation. Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly observe these parameters in the available data set. Instead, we utilize analyst coverage as a proxy for the efficiency of information diffusion. Specifically, analyst coverage is defined as the number of analysts who reported fiscal year 1 estimates of earning per share available in I/B/E/S Historical Summary File during sample period. As Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) suggested, we consider that more analyst coverage implies more efficient information flow, which could reduce potential rents earned from moral hazard. Hence, it is expected that an increase of analyst coverage reduces operational risk loss events, if other things being equal.
Bhushan (1989) and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) stress that the analyst coverage measure is strongly correlated with firm size. We also identify the significant correlation (0.64 with logtransformed revenue, REVENUE). Therefore, following Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), we use residual analyst coverage (ANALYST) as our information flow efficiency variable. The residual analyst coverage is a standardized residual estimated by regressing the number of analysts on REVENUE and year dummies. Table 2 reports the estimation result.
[ Insert Table 2 Here ]
We employ two others: life insurer indicator variable (LIFE) and health insurer indicator variable (HEALTH). These variables are defined by the SIC life insurance industry code and health/accident insurance industry code, respectively.
Life insurance policies are more likely to have a longer policy period and there is little, if any, opportunity for policyholders to personally receive the service guaranteed by the policy. These conditions may make it difficult for potential customers to update their beliefs based on policyholder experience. Thus, we expect that the life insurer indicator will be positively associated with a larger reputation value. However, it should be noted that the life insurer indicator does not necessarily imply more frequent moral hazard as long as the equilibrium holds. Therefore, no significant effect of this indicator variable is expected.
The opposite effect is expected with regard to the health insurer indicator. The claim frequency of health insurance tends to be greater than for other insurance products such as auto insurance.
Since receiving high-quality professional service is generally very important to health insurance customers, claims experience information may travel efficiently to potential customers. It is thus reasonable to expect that the health insurer indicator will be associated with relatively smaller reputation value in equilibrium. However, this variable tends to be time constant and is not expected to have a significant impact on moral hazard again.
Irrational Beliefs:
We introduce stock return volatility and the trading volume to capture shareholders' irrational beliefs. A large volatility should be observed when investors hold heterogeneous beliefs about the valuation of the fundamentals (e.g. Hong and Stein, 2007) . Assuming short-sales constraints, heterogeneous beliefs cause overvaluation of firm fundamentals. The measure is defined as a log-transformed standard deviation of daily stock holding returns, and is denoted as VOLATILITY.
Numerous studies (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) find trading volume to be a significant indicator of market sentiment, and argue that trading volume appear to be positively associated with mispricing. For the cases where momentum effects prevail, including the stock trading volume measure helps capture the mispricing effect. TURNOVER is defined as the log-transformed ratio of the firm-year mean value of the daily trading volume to the common stock outstanding at the end of the year.
These two irrational belief measures are expected to be positively associated with the frequency of loss events, although a positive sign on the turnover coefficient may also imply that undervaluation is associated with insurer moral hazard. Under the assumption of a short-sales constraint, a positive sign suggests the impact of overpricing. If rational managers are aware that the stock is overvalued, they are likely to choose the opportunistic strategy so as to take advantage of the current overvaluation to maximize the profit.
Capital-to-Asset Ratio: As discussed in Section 2, it is well-known that capital-to-asset ratio (or leverage ratio) affects risk-taking incentives. If default option value dominates insurer's risk-taking incentives, the capital-to-asset ratio would be inversely associated with risk-taking incentives. In contrast, the positive association would be observed if the level of capital is optimally risk-adjusted.
We define capital-to-asset ratio (CAPRATIO) by 1-(Liability/Asset). In addition, we add the interaction term between the TOBINSQ and CAPRATIO (TOBINSQ*CAPRATIO). The purpose of this term is to investigate the effectiveness of franchise value as a risk-constraining incentive in different the level of capital. For instance, the coefficient would show a negative sign if insurer's franchise value constrains its risk-taking when the insurer has adequate capital.
Control Variables:
As mentioned earlier, we control firm size effects on the number of operational risk loss events in two ways. In addition to dividing the number of events by firm revenue, we also employ the logarithm of the assets (ASSET) in our analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
The distributions of the operational risk loss event measures and summary statistics of the variables are reported in Table 3 (See also Table 1 for variable descriptions). Panel A in Table 3 shows the distributions of the loss events. The majority of observations have zero operational risk loss events.
The maximum number of events is not significantly large: three for internally-caused events and two for externally-caused events. Thus, the distribution does not have long-tail.
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in our analysis. TOBINSQ is the log-transformed Q ratio and is distributed around zero, as expected, although there are some extreme values. CAPRATIO indicates that sample average capital-to-asset ratio is 28%, and grows by about 5%. EPS is $2 and declines by 30% on average during the sample period. The industry average stock return and the return from SP500 index (excess return) are 13.4% and 6.2% on average, respectively. Beta shows that the average stock return sensitivity is 0.55 during the sample period. Note that Interest rate is multiplied by 100 for convenience. Life insurers and health insurers account for 23% and 16% of our sample insurers, respectively.
Pearson correlation coefficients across the primary variables are shown in Table 4 . Looking at the column of EVENTS(Internal), we observed the strongest correlation with ASSET, though the response variable is divided by REVENUE. TOBINSQ, BETA, ANALYST and TURNOVER are also strongly positively associated with the response variable before controlling other effects.
CAPRATIO and VOLATILITY are inversely related with the response variable.
The second column presents correlations with the static TOBINSQ. The strongest positive correlation can be observed on CAPRATIO. It may be intuitive that a higher capital-to-asset ratio (a higher leverage) is related to a large TOBINSQ (a smaller TOBINSQ). In addition, TOBINSQ is positively associated with BETA, ANALYST, HEALTH and TURNOVER. In contrast, we observe a negative coefficient on the LIFE variable. These are inconsistent with our prediction that life (health) insurers should have a greater (smaller) reputation value than others. In addition, a negative significance between LIFE and ANALYST and a positive significance between HEALTH and ANALSYT support our argument regarding information diffusion differential between life insurers and health insurers.
Overall, the strongest correlation is -0.48 between ASSET and VOLATILITY; the others are all less than 0.4. All the variance inflation factors (VIF) of independent variables are less than 2, indicating that our concern for multicollinearity may be relaxed.
[ Insert Table 3 Here ]
Model Specification
To test whether the factors identified in the theoretical argument do indeed distort insurer decisions, eventually leading to a loss of stakeholder confidence, we employ EVENTS(Internal) and EVENTS(External) as our response variable. As observed earlier, most of the observations of response variables are zero. To model the count data, we consider the model:
where the frequency is Poisson distributed with the mean λ it . Due to non-normality, we employ a generalized linear model to estimate the parameters. x stands for the vector of independent variables (at time t) discussed in the previous section and intercept.
Estimation Results
Results for internally-caused operational risk loss events are reported in Table 5 and Table 6 , while those for externally-caused operational risk loss events are reported in Table 7 and Table 8 . Table   5 -8 present the GEE estimators of the Poisson model, and reported p-values are based on empirical standard errors. The purpose of employing GEE estimation is to handle heterogeneity in panel data.
We compare models under different working correlation assumptions: independent and AR (1) (See Table 5 and Table 6 ). Overall, the estimation results for the different working correlations do not differ substantively. First, the GEE estimation model fit criterion, log likelihood, does not improve at all when AR(1) working correlations are assumed. This implies that the serial correlation structure does not help explain the dynamics of the frequency of loss events. 11
[ Insert Table 5 Here ]
[ Insert Table 6 Here ] Table 5 reports parameter estimates of models under independent working correlation assumption, and four models are estimated. The response variable, EVENTS(Internal) is a internallycaused event measure. All variables of interest are included in Model (1). In Model (2), TOBISNSQ and PC TOBINSQ are removed to see the impact of the all-in-one measures. Model (3) focuses only on exogenous variables, and Model (4) focuses on factors frequently discussed in risk-taking literature. All models are controlled by firm size, ASSET.
As it turns out, the Q ratio, the capita-asset ratio, and the interaction term are all significant, and the estimators are consistent between models. First, the Q ratio shows a positive coefficient with 1% significance. That is, a larger future rent or a greater reputation is associated with more conflicts of interest. This result is inconsistent with franchise value theory. We expected negative 11 We also test under exchangeable working correlation. The result is almost identical with other estimation results.
coefficients on the Q ratio because we believed that a positive future outlook would discourage insurers from creating new conflicts of interest.
Despite our expectation that the larger the Q ratio, the lower the incentives to behave with moral hazard, a number of conditions may alter that relationship. One scenario that could induce a positive association between future rents and moral hazard is an extended time since insurer establishment. It is possible that highly reputed insurers no longer benefit from continuing to offer high-quality policies. Customers may fully anticipate that those insurers will perform contracts as the consumers expect, attributing observations of low-quality policies to just accidents (e.g. Holmström, 1999) . 12 Thus, the cost of risk-taking could be smaller when an insurer has a long duration of strong positive reputation. We do not currently have a measure for duration, a factor to consider for future research.
Imperfect market discipline could be another source that explains a positive association. For instance, customers may not switch their insurer even after observing adverse information due to the associated costs such as search cost. If insurers recognize such customer behavior, the reduced market discipline increases the amount of rent in equilibrium, while the market condition could weaken incentives for insurers to keep exerting best efforts (See Hörner, 2002 , for the existence of competitive equilibrium).
We may also justify the positive association between franchise value and risk-taking by insurance underwriting cycle suggested by Ren and Schmit (2008) . Note that, as reported in Table 3, earning per share declines by 28% on average during our sample period. This may implies that price-cutting competition is likely to be intense. In such market, insurers with higher franchise value may take greater risk than those with smaller franchise value do. Thus, existing reputation theories could support the possibilities of positive association between the Q ratio and risk-taking. In order to identify factors that cause the positive association, further research is necessary.
In addition, it is worthwhile to note that this result offer another insight to Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006) , who find that firms with a larger Q ratio tend to incur greater reputational loss.
Combining these results, it is possible to conclude that insurers with larger Q ratio tend to create more conflicts of interest and to suffer a greater loss of reputation.
A positive significance on capital-asset ratio indicates that well-capitalized insurers are associated with more operational risk loss events. This result seems consistent with the findings by Cummins and Sommer (1996) , which argue that insurers balance the level of capital and risk to achieve their desired overall insolvency risk.
Furthermore, it is interesting that we find a negative significance on the interaction term between Q ratio and capital-asset ratio. The negative coefficient can be interpreted that franchise value effectively constrains risk-taking for well-capitalized insurers; but franchise value loses a selfregulating effect when insurer's leverage ratio is large.
In terms of discount factors, only interest rate and its percent change show significance. A higher interest rate and a decline of interest rate are associated with more risk-taking. This can be interpreted that insurers may be more likely to take excessive risks when overall economy performs good and when economy slows down. A positive sign on interest rate has another potential explanation that a high interest rate devalues insurer's assets and induces risk-taking incentives.
Thus, the excess industry average return and the excess market index return are both insignificant. It is interesting that it is the overall economy condition, rather than the idiosyncratic return, that has a strong influence on insurers' risk-taking.
In contrast, we observe positive significance on stock market Beta in Model (2) and Model (3).
This result can be explained by its significant positive correlation with the Q ratio and its negative correlation with the capital-asset ratio. Since a large market risk tend to be associated with a large franchise value and a low capital ratio (a high leverage ratio), those effects are expressed as an impact of insurer's systematic risk in Model (2) and Model (3).
The significance of the interest rate variable and the stock market Beta gives rise to a practical implication of our work, which is that insurers need to be monitored especially closely when the overall economy is growing and when insurer's systematic risk is large because those conditions tend to give rise to conflicts of interest.
We attempted to capture the effects of information diffusion efficiency by means of the residual analyst coverage variables. While the static variable does not show significance, its percent change variable shows negative significance as expected. This indicates that more analyst coverage, which attains more efficient information diffusion, is associated with less risk-taking incentives due to reduced benefits obtaining from moral hazard. However, the coefficients are not significantly large.
Life insurer indicators show its significance only in Model (3). Similarly to stock market Beta variable, this can be explained by the significant negative correlations between life insurer indicator and both of the Q ratio and the capital-asset ratio. Since life insurers tend to have a relatively small franchise value and a relatively low capital ratio, those effects are internalized in life insurer indicator by removing two variables.
Regarding to irrational belief measures, the stock return volatility variable shows unanticipated negative sign in Model (2) and Model (3). And the result does not support our story that heterogeneous beliefs cause to overvalue insurer's fundamentals. Rather, the volatility variable captures the positive association between the stock return volatility and stock price. And, when the Q ratio is removed from the models, the negative coefficients turn out significant due to the relation between the volatility of stock return and the stock value.
In Table 7 and Table 8 , we present estimation results for externally-caused loss events as the response variable. Table 7 shows the result where the response variable includes ten September 11 loss events, and the result obtained by excluding those events are presented in Table 8 . Both estimation results are obtained under the assumption of independent working correlation. The results obtained from these models are not substantially different each other. One Interesting finding is that the Q ratio variable and the interaction term between Q ratio and the capital ratio are both significant with the same sign as before.
We should note, however, that the number of low events is not significantly large in our entire observation. Further, externally-caused loss events are small even when September 11 events are included. When September 11 events are removed, only thirteen events are left in the analysis.
Thus, we should be cautious in the robustness of the test results.
Regardless of the lack of sufficient events to draw statistical implication, we can still argue the reason that estimation results could be similar between internally-caused events and externallycaused events. Remember that one of event-type included in EVENT(External) is external fraud defined by BIS as a level 1 category of operational risk loss event. Events in the category are mainly caused by a third party fraud. And events that are not categorized into BIS-types such as strategic risk are also included in this measure. We reasonably induce that a third party firm's risk-taking can be considered as own risk-taking as well. Although the direct causes of loss events may be categorized as "external," insurers take the "external risk" by their decisions, which is nothing but "internal."
[ Insert Table 7 Here ]
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Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to identify the primary determinants of reputational risk. Our approach is to consider the conditions where reputation equilibrium is not sustained. When the incentive constraint consisting of reputation model is not satisfied, we can argue that insurers are willing to take the opportunistic strategy, which causes conflicts of interest. Thus, identifying factors that violate the incentive constraint should be potential candidates of reputational risk.
In our empirical analysis, theoretically identified factors are examined, and we conclude that a large franchise value, a large capital-asset ratio (a low leverage ratio), an increase of earning per share, a high interest rate and its decline, efficient information diffusion are considered to be factors that induce insurer's moral hazard, if other things being equal. When focusing on exogenous factors, we also identify that a large systematic risk, property-liability insurers, and a small volatility of stock return are positively associated with insurer's risk-taking.
Which of those are the most robust depends on reader's interest. If one focuses on implications to existing bank and insurer risk-taking studies, it would be franchise value and the capital-asset ratio. On the contrary to the franchise value theory, a large franchise value does not work as risk-constraining incentives. This may be evidence that insurers with a large franchise value could be more aggressive to protect their franchise value, as suggested by Saunders and Wilson (2001) and Ren and Schmit (2008) . In addition, reputation theory provides another potential explanation that insurer's good reputation itself could cause risk-taking incentives.
The effect of the capital-to-asset ratio is consistent with Cummins and Sommer (1996) . Insurers seem to choose risk-adjusted capital to achieve their optimal insolvency risk. The interaction term between those two variables shows that franchise value provide risk-constraining incentives for wellcapitalized insurers but not for highly leveraged insurers. Focusing on exogenous variables, one may be interested in the effect of interest rate and systematic risk. When interest rate is high and when it is declining, insurers tend to start committing operational risk, which takes years to be publicly revealed. In other words, it is suggested that insurers should be monitored especially when overall economy performs well and when it slows down. Further, insurer's systematic risk can be also a good indicator in that Beta is positively associated with insurer's risk-taking.
We also observe that efficient information diffusion can discourage insurers to take risks. Although this factor tend to be ignored, how effectively information is sent and how fast stakeholders update their beliefs are key ingredients for reputational risk.
One may wonder that those factors may be associated with insurer's operational risk but may not necessarily cause loss of reputation. This critique is reasonable in that our analysis only focuses on whether conflicts of interest are initiated, and that can be considered as not a sufficient condition of reputational loss but a necessary condition. Thus, it should be noted that stakeholders' confidence in insurer's operation can be lost because their beliefs regarding the insurer's operation deviate from its fundamentals. In this paper, we examine the factors that lead the deviation.
Whether such moral hazard is associated with actual loss of reputation value has been widely studied, and one may consult reference such as Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006) for the comparison between insurance and banking industries, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) for financial misrepresentation and Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) and Gillet, Hubner, and Plunus (2007) for internal fraud. These studies are sufficient to connect insurer's moral hazard with the loss of reputation value. For other studies, which also have implications to the association between firm's moral hazard and loss of reputation value, readers may refer Section 2.
For the limitation of our empirical study, the number of subjects is limited because we investigate publicly traded US-based insurance companies. And the number of operational risk loss events for those firms are not significantly large. Extending our study to banking industry may allow sufficiently large loss events, which may lead more stable results. YEAR**** 1 if observation year is ****, 0 otherwise All variables are annual basis. 225 firms are observed in maximum 10 year periods. CRSP daily stock file data is used for market related data, and CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged DatabaseFundamentals Annual is used to collect financial statement data. 
This table reports the coefficients of externally-caused operational risk loss event models. Models are estimated under the assumption of independent working correlation. The response variable, EVENTS(External) is the number of operational risk loss events in a year divided by REVENUE. Variable descriptions are provided in Table 1 . All variables of interest are included in Model (1). In Model (2), TOBISNSQ and PC TOBINSQ are removed to see the impact. Model (3) focuses only on exogenous variables. And, Model (4) focuses on factors frequently discussed in risk-taking literature. All models are controlled by ASSET. 
This table reports the coefficients of externally-caused operational risk loss event models. Models are estimated under the assumption of independent working correlation. The response variable, EVENTS(External) is the number of operational risk loss events in a year divided by REVENUE. All September 1 related events are removed from the response variable. Variable descriptions are provided in Table 1 . All variables of interest are included in Model (1). In Model (2), TOBISNSQ and PC TOBINSQ are removed to see the impact. Model (3) focuses only on exogenous variables. And, Model (4) focuses on factors frequently discussed in risk-taking literature. All models are controlled by ASSET.
